Image: US Department of Defense. (L-R) Australia’s Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Affairs Minister Penny Wong; the United States’ Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. August 2024.
Resolution of the tension between President Biden’s policy of strengthening America’s position through allies and partners, and the US Navy’s (USN) mission requirements, will come to a head in the next president’s term. The AUKUS nuclear-powered submarines will be at the centre.
Biden has stressed American leadership in mobilising allies and partners to address global problems and international crises. He has utilised both NATO and the G7 in this regard, most recently in support of Ukraine in its conflict with Russia. Working through existing treaty arrangements, the Administration has enhanced military-to-military relations between Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia to counter China’s growing strength. Efforts to bring India and the ASEAN states into an anti-China grouping have been less successful. However, AUKUS has been the boldest move.
Enthusiastically embraced by the former Morrison government, and consummated by the Albanese government, the most revolutionary component of AUKUS is the agreement to allow the transfer of nuclear submarine propulsion technology to Australia. Initially through the acquisition of 3 to 5 Virginia class submarines from the US, Australia will then procure joint UK-Australia designed and constructed nuclear-powered submarines.
The AUKUS program has again been receiving media attention because of the recent tabling in Parliament of a three-party agreement concerning the practical implementation arrangements which contains ‘get-out’ clauses aimed at protecting the US’s defence and security interests. However, Australian Ministers and in particular the Defence Minister, continue to express unqualified confidence that the AUKUS submarines will eventuate.
As China’s military strength grows, and as its shipbuilding industry out-performs America in the production of warships and nuclear submarines, American military concerns about the balance-of-forces in the Western Pacific increases. Even without the possible transfer of 3 to 5 Virginia class submarines to Australia, the American submarine industrial base cannot keep up with the USN’s demand.
To meet the procurement target of the USN, without AUKUS, the American submarine industrial base will need to increase the current annual production of Virginia class boats from 1.2 boats to 2.0 per year by 2028. To concurrently meet USN and AUKUS requirements, it will be necessary to nearly double current production to 2.33 boats per year after that. The USN has been struggling to increase the production rate for some time, and this appears to be a very challenging stretch target. Notwithstanding, Australia has already transferred billions of dollars to support development of the US [and UK] industrial base.
On current planning, the USN’s nuclear submarine force will experience a ‘trough’ that would bottom out at 47 boats in 2030, then grow to 50 boats by 2032, and get to force target of 64 or 66 by 2054. It is anticipated that Australia will receive one boat in 2032 and one in 2035, and the third in 2038. This so-called USN capability ‘trough’ would be extended to at least 2040 if 3 Virginia-class boats are sold to Australia, last potentially until 2046 if 4 are sold to Australia, and be pushed out to 2049 if Australia gets 5 boats, according to US Congressional Research Service and Congressional Budget Office estimates.
Add to this the impact of the maintenance backlog on submarine availability. About one third of USN nuclear submarines are in depot maintenance or idle awaiting depot maintenance, and this number has been steadily growing. Consequently, the number of operationally available vessels has been substantially reduced putting an increased load on the rest of the fleet. It is easy to see why American force planners are confronting a looming crisis. Unless the problems with submarine construction and the depot maintenance backlog can be successfully addressed, the transfers to Australia will fall in the middle of the capability ‘trough’ facing the USN. This would exacerbate a crisis in American capability through the 2030s and into the 2040s.
Congressional support for AUKUS is undoubted, as evidenced by the AUKUS Submarine Transfer Authorisation Act. Nevertheless, there is a strong undercurrent of anxiety about America’s declining nuclear submarine numbers relative to China. Congressional representatives have heard consistent testimony of concern about the availability of nuclear submarines from senior US military officers, and have expressed their own doubts about the Navy’s plan for increasing submarine production.
By 2028 the next American administration may need to decide between following through with AUKUS or ensuring the operational viability of America’s own nuclear submarine force. Biden’s fixation on an American leadership role among allies and partners is unlikely to survive into the next administration, certainly not with the same zeal. America’s traditional placement of its security concerns above all else could confront the prospect of America’s capacity to match China being diminished by the transfer of military assets to an ally.
That America placed get-out provisions in the tabled Agreement on AUKUS is thus unsurprising. America can exit AUKUS after “giving at least one year’s written notice”. Any transfer of knowledge or equipment will proceed only if “the Originating Party determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security”. Additionally, at the Biden Administration’s insistence, Congress legislated that “no combatant vessel of the Navy may be sold, transferred, or otherwise disposed of unless the Chief of Naval Operations certifies that it is not essential to the defense of the United States”. America could need all of these get-out clauses.
In June 2024 the US Government Accountability Office assessed that “Navy will be challenged to improve production enough to meet the Australia-United Kingdom-United States initiative for Australia to acquire conventionally-armed nuclear-powered submarines, while also meeting the Navy’s planned submarine fleet numbers.” That is the quandary the next American administration could likely confront.
Obviously, the next Australian government could be facing the collapse of the AUKUS project before the end of its term. No matter who wins the US presidency this year, they will in all likelihood have to make a decision on AUKUS. That might see adherence to the deal as structured, significant delay in selling the submarines, or abandoning AUKUS.
AUKUS is a reckless gamble with Australia’s security. The Australian public deserves an open and frank debate on AUKUS. Logically, AUKUS and the alternatives should be a major issue at the next Australian election.
Copyright Mike Scrafton. This article may be reproduced under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence for non-commercial purposes, and providing that work is not altered, only redistributed, and the original author is credited. Please see the Cross-post and re-use policy for more information.
Also published in John Menadue’s Pearls and Irritations.