A requiem for the Indo-Pacific Strategy: Trump’s Arctic pivot

President Trump’s foreign policy could have been inspired by the 1884 Berlin Conference where the major European powers marked their spheres of influence with lines on a map of Africa. The retreating Arctic ice has revealed the new ‘Africa’ sparking a new scramble for resources wealth that Trump wants in on. 

Quoting ‘national security’ provides little justification for Trump’s interest in acquiring  Greenland and Canada. To ascertain the logic, if there is any, behind these ambitions begins with a map, as does all good geopolitical analysis. 

The retreat of Arctic ice under the influence of global warming is having dramatic climatic and environmental impacts, but the opportunities for shipping and mineral extraction are the main strategic interests. However, the Arctic poses a complex set of political and strategic challenges, as well as presenting a difficult locus for operations. 

The Arctic Sea region is thought to contain the largest reserves of oil, coal, and gas, plus extensive deposits of nickel, cobalt, zinc, platinum, palladium, diamonds, and rare earth metals. The geophysical aspects of the Arctic are undoubtedly gathering attention in capitals, including Washington. This is a bonanza of critical resources from which America cannot allow itself to be excluded while other states benefit. 

Trump’s evolving strategic view might be crystallising. The Arctic Ocean is bound by the coasts of six nations – United States (Alaska), Canada, Russia, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland). The Alaskan Arctic coast is significantly smaller than the Arctic coasts of Russia, Canada, and Greenland. Alaska is not just separated from the continental US, but has one of the nation’s smallest populations and the lowest population density. Obtaining Canada and Greenland would allow America to rival Russia’s access.

Viable all-season maritime navigation in the Arctic has become feasible. The Northeast route along the Russian shoreline, the Northwest Passage via the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, and the Arctic Sea Bridge connecting Russia and Canada, could become ice-free. The West Coast of America could benefit from access to Europe through the Arctic in a time of conflict in East Asia. As an aside, the potential for disruption in maritime traffic in East and Southeast Asia in wartime might be a factor in the renewed interest in control of the Panama Canal for West Coast access to Europe.

The prime strategic focus for America, though, is access to the mineral and other resources in the Arctic. This presents the Trump Administration with three salient problems. Currently they don’t have the access possessed by Russia and Canada. This could be resolved by the acquisition of Greenland and/or Canada. In addition, America lacks the naval and commercial fleets required to maintain a strong presence in the Arctic, nor does it have available the infrastructure necessary for the extraction of minerals. Finally, it will take considerable time to establish the required supporting infrastructure for major Arctic operations. Neither territorial expansion, nor the revitalisation and expansion of the America shipbuilding industrial base signalled in Trump’s speech to Congress, are proximate.

Russia, in close cooperation with China, will undoubtedly be positioning itself to dominate the Arctic. To get into the Arctic game quickly, Trump has little alternative than to partner with Russia. Cooperative partnering arrangements might also tempt Russia out of the Chinese sphere. This could involve providing Russia with access to American technology and capital, in return for the use of Russian ports and other infrastructure. The US would gain Russian expertise and experience operating in the Arctic in exchange. Particularly important in the short term, would be reliance on Russia’s icebreaker-capable fleet, which is larger than that of the combined NATO countries.

Russia’s exclusive economic zone in the Arctic is far larger than America’s but the addition of those of Canada and Greenland, were they to be acquired, would establish close to parity. In the medium term, however, America’s best prospects for access to Arctic resources would lie in partnering with Russia. Murmansk will be essential if America hopes for operations in the Arctic Ocean. The all-year Russian port of Murmansk is the biggest Arctic shipping hub and can service any type of vessel.

It was reported that following the recent Russian and American Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Saudi Arabia that “specific areas of cooperation” were discussed, including “maybe joint projects in the Arctic”. A Russian representative said, “We specifically discussed the Arctic.” This was the first real acknowledgement that the Arctic issue might be playing a major role in Trump’s Ukraine considerations. 

If the Arctic has become central to America’s policy it would knit together a number of matters. Trump’s desire to bring Russia in from the cold, including G8 membership, which couldn’t happen without the lifting of economic and financial sanctions. The Administration’s desire to acquire Greenland and Canada can also be explained in the context of an Arctic strategy. As can Trump’s otherwise unexplained push for a revitalised shipbuilding industry. This all points to Trump prioritising the North Atlantic and the Arctic in his foreign policy. 

Trump seems unconcerned if gaining a foothold in the Arctic comes at the cost of transatlantic relations and NATO. Making America Great Again is not to be achieved through war and confrontation among the major powers for Trump. Certainly with regard to Russia, Trump appears far less concerned with military alliances than the commercial possibilities that might flow from good relations with powerful states.  

Trump will maintain sufficient military power to limit China’s actions in the South China Sea, if necessary. But don’t expect to hear him going on about the Indo-Pacific. If the above analysis is right, we can expect the Trump Administration to be less concerned about allies in the Indo-Pacific and prepared to default to Australia and India to manage the Indian Ocean and South Pacific respectively.

Like the 1884 Berlin Conference’s attendees, Trump looks prepared to collude with strong players to divide up the resources, albeit in the Arctic not Africa. In the process the contest with China will cede priority to the North Atlantic. 

Copyright Mike Scrafton. This article may be reproduced under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence for non-commercial purposes, and providing that work is not altered, only redistributed, and the original author is credited. Please see the Cross-post and re-use policy for more information.