What is really at stake in Ukraine? In simple terms, Alfred Thayer Mahan, Halford Mackinder, and Nicholas Spykman, the godfathers of geopolitics, saw geography, and in particular control of the Eurasian land mass, as the key determinant in great power relations. Geography was a lens that brought a sharper focus to longer term geopolitical shifts.
For Spykman, the Rimlands were key to the struggle between the sea-powers and the Eurasian land-powers for control of the Eurasian heartland. The Rimlands encircle the Eurasian powers of Russia and China, providing the arena where the older North American and European hegemonic alliance in retreat grinds up against the emerging Eurasian powers in political, economic, and military competition. Aside from Ukraine, today’s Rimlands include Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iran in the West, and the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the Philippines in the East. The Arctic seas to the North, and India, and Vietnam might complete the Rimlands outline.
Ukraine’s Rimland geopolitical status is central to understanding the how the war relates to retreat of the American sphere. The resurgence of Eurasian power might not be imminent, but the longer term prospects look gloomy for America. The disinclination to put combat troops in Ukraine comes from the fear it would see an acceleration of the American decline as a global power. The conscious distancing from confrontation with Eurasia is also evident in President Trump’s policies. The imbalance in access to industrial capacity, technology and military strength between Eurasian states and America and its allies has vanished. The global presence of the Eurasian states is rising. The expanding BRICS is both evidence and symbol of this transition.
National power is largely concerned with industrial capacity, demographics, geography, and the security of the homeland. China’s homeland is now largely impregnable to American military power. China’s vast industrial capacity and shipbuilding industry is the paramount geostrategic fact of the times. As Lloyd Austin, US Defense Secretary, told the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, China is “already a regional hegemon”.
China has no fear of the American military. In a drawn out land war with Russia in Ukraine, America would inevitably be enervated. Even if successful, it would exhaust much of America’s military might. The explanation for the ‘no-boots-on-the-ground’ strategy in Ukraine relates directly to the capacity to fight China. Russia’s nuclear threat is secondary.
An American land invasion of the Chinese homeland is inconceivable. China sits secure from invasion behind its topography and geography which provide it with unrivalled strategic depth. Avenues for a land invasion are non-existent. China is surrounded by nations like Russia, with deeply shared interests, or dependent states that are not American-oriented or likely to facilitate the transition of American forces. Dreams of separating Russia and China are facile, as neither could tolerate its neighbour falling under the sway of America’s influence without having grave concerns for its own security.
Of course, America has the capacity to challenge China in a high-intensity conflict in the South China Sea; but only once. Some scenarios might see America prevail or break-even, however, even in either of those circumstances America would inevitably suffer a huge loss of military assets and high casualties. The likely material damage inflicted on American allies like Japan and Korea would be devastating.
Following such a conflict, it’s unlikely America would be able to maintain a meaningful forward force posture in the Western Pacific again, and it would probably lack the will to do so. China’s huge industrial base extends for approximately 1,500 kilometres from its Eastern seaboard and into the contiguous hinterland. While China’s industrial base would undoubtedly suffer significantly in a conflict with America, it would recover its military productive capacity over time and regain the strength to protect its proximate areas. But reestablishment of an American maritime expeditionary force capable of again challenging China in the South China Sea would most likely never happen.
America has already failed to achieve the primary objective of the grand strategy it adopted postwar, which has been to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon in Eurasia. What does this mean for American hegemony? The downward journey of previous hegemons and empires provides many examples of uneven collapse. Although some hegemonic collapses in the past have occurred unexpectedly and spectacularly, or have abrupt rather than gradual trajectories, America’s inherent economic resilience will probably see it being an unavoidable major player for a long time to come. Although a major war in East Asia might see a dramatic shift in geopolitical relativities.
Where does this leave an ally like Australia? Australia’s policy elites are deeply engaged in preparing for a war with China, under the command of America, despite protestation to the contrary. The North of the continent is being transformed into an American operating base and Australia’s regional relationships are increasingly being militarised under American direction. Through demands that Australia commit to siding with any American military action over Taiwan, the AUKUS decision is already being revealed as contrivance to lock Australia in against Eurasia.
The justification is deterrence; a delusional strategy that assumes that in an arms race only China can be bluffed. A manifestation of blind confidence that at the decision point, when everything is on the line, American resolve won’t quail and falter if China calls its bluff. A deeply flawed and dangerous gamble.
What would the prognosis be for the protagonists? Can it really be believed that in their Eurasian citadel, and fighting in areas proximate to their homeland, the Chinese won’t have greater motivation and determination to engage in conflict? That China won’t see that in the long run it has more to gain?
The benefits for America from a war in the South China Sea are not really apparent, but the losses are. Win, lose or draw China will still be there, but America’s continued presence would become unsustainable. This is the risk the Australian strategic cognoscenti seem prepared to take. The prospect of Australia effectively being alone, as a former adversary, in China’s sphere. It doesn’t make sense.
Predicting the course of the Trump administration is perilous, but the rise of isolationism it foreshadows, and the withdrawal from the Rimlands contest implied, would bemuse the geopolitical godfathers. They might see Ukraine as where the postwar maps begin to be redrawn.
Trump is perhaps not so much an instrument of America’s fall, but a sign of impersonal historical and geopolitical forces playing out. Or so Mahan, Mackinder, and Spykman might conclude.
Copyright Mike Scrafton. This article may be reproduced under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence for non-commercial purposes, and providing that work is not altered, only redistributed, and the original author is credited. Please see the Cross-post and re-use policy for more information.