Image: US Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth, fastens the last screw on a new name plaque at the River Entrance of the Pentagon on 13 November 2025
US Defense Secretary Hegseth’s comments on rules of engagement (RoE) presage the looming demise of ANZUS, as the United States becomes an unsuitable ally. Combined military operations and interoperability will become more difficult. The American-Australian alliance is in bad need of an unsentimental reassessment of its continuing value.
Alliances create obligations between states in the case of war or threat of war. Formal alliances are rarely entered into when a conflict is imminent, but constitute a strategic move engendered by a change in the international balance of power, or when a potential mutual threat is emerging. The ongoing ANZUS logic has been sustained over time by anxiety over a reemergent Japan, a perceived threat from the Soviet Union, the ‘war on terror’, and more recently, fears of a hostile China.
Over 92 percent of all living Australians have lived in the warm embrace of the 1951 ANZUS treaty. Australia’s and America’s strategic interests been aligned beneath its protective canopy. Australia has benefited through access to American military hardware and intelligence, and acquired a greater international profile and enhanced diplomatic heft.
These things haven’t come for free. Australia has aligned much of its foreign and strategic policy with that of its ally, and Australian forces have joined in numerous campaigns alongside America, even when the direct strategic priority for Australia was dubious. Unwavering support has been offered in international forums. This subordination was made easier and more digestible because of shared language, culture, and history, and a shared sense of being part of a Western democratic civilisational assemblage. Questioning ANZUS rarely occurred to Australian leaders.
Foremost, ANZUS is a security alliance. An alliance that does not align with Australia’s interests can generate actual strategic harm. Australian political leaders must now reaffirm for themselves, and convince the electorate, that ANZUS is still in Australia’s interests. Being tethered tightly to the US military as a way of ensuring Australia’s security, and bracketing Australia’s national interests inseparably with American foreign policy objectives, are no longer so obviously beneficial.
There is now just one purpose for the US military, indiscriminate violence. They’ll be slim, fit, short-haired, sans barbe, and overwhelmingly male; they’ll “fight to win …[and] … unleash overwhelming and punishing violence on the enemy”, says Hegseth. European and Pacific US allies have now to determine if the American military described by Hegseth is a suitable partner. Hegseth said the US military “also don’t fight with stupid rules of engagement (RoE)”. He wants to “untie the hands of our warfighters to intimidate, demoralise, hunt and kill the enemies of our country”. Absent from this are the concepts from the Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC) and humanitarian law which lie at the core of RoE – those of discrimination, proportionality, necessity, and humanity.
The primary purpose of RoE is to limit the harm caused by warfare, and to avoid death and destruction unrelated to military objectives. The rules regulate, constrain, and civilise, to the extent possible, warfare. Hegseth didn’t say America would do away with RoE, but that there would be “No more politically correct and overbearing rules of engagement, just common sense, maximum lethality and authority for warfighters”. The enemies of America “will be crushed by the violence, precision and ferocity of the War Department” as “Lethality is our calling card and victory our only acceptable end state”. A disturbing philosophy.
RoE are not easy to draft. They must be practical, and ensure that the political purpose of any conflict is able to be met, and that operational considerations of the mission are supported and not unreasonably constrained. They must be clear and implementable under the uncertainty of war and the pressures of combat. While RoE are not focused on how, tactically, a military action or mission is carried out, they do inform commanders about when and how, and under what conditions, lethal force can legitimately be employed while remaining consistent with the Laws of Armed Conflict (LoAC). RoE make clear for commanders what actions they are authorised to undertake, the types of actions or failures to act that might result in punishments.
For combined operations involving allies, the RoE of each military need to be highly compatible. There must be pre-agreement on what is permitted in the field. In addition, the application of military force is never apolitical, or divorced from the expectations of the population or domestic politics. Because without public support, and confidence that the behaviour of the military in conflict is consistent with the basic norms and principles of the society, support for the armed forces could dissipate.
If Hegseth’s intention in “drastically reducing the ridiculous amount of mandatory training that individuals and units must execute” means abandoning familiarisation of troops with LoAC then there is a problem for US-allied forces. The American military that Australia’s major ally will field for exercises, on operations, or in combat, will not be like the ADF that will deploy and train with them. It’s not alarmist to suggest that, on the basis of Hegseth’s words, the two forces might have RoE so incompatible that interoperability is made so difficult as to become impractical.
Concerningly, Hegseth’s words appear symptomatic of the abandonment of democratic norms and international law, and a disregard of allies’ interests. So, apart from LoAC considerations and the degradation in security cooperation, Australia needs to ponder the dangers in continuing with the symbiotic relationship between the ADF and a new American military culture that is emblematic of the disturbing political, legal, social, and moral transition taking place in the US.
Australian politicians and citizens alike must ask themselves if they want the ADF to be exposed to an ‘extreme warrior’ culture. Is it desirable for an attitude that diminishes the role of women in combat, casts doubt on the merit and suitability of marginalised groups to contribute, or accepts the deployment of troops against citizens, one with which the ADF should become familiar or infected?
Arguably, ANZUS is no longer fit for purpose. The America of 1951 no longer exists, and the things that made ANZUS workable are disappearing. The moment for Australia to disconnect is here.
Copyright Mike Scrafton. This article may be reproduced under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence for non-commercial purposes, and providing that work is not altered, only redistributed, and the original author is credited. Please see the Cross-post and re-use policy for more information.