Image: High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Kaja Kallas, responds to the Trump administration’s ’28 point Ukraine-Russia peace plan’, 20 November 2025
A permanent cessation of hostilities in Ukraine along the current front line, whether followed by frozen conflict or a negotiated peace settlement, will bring strategic instability to Eastern Europe and disrupt global geopolitics. Vacillation bred perhaps of a lack of shared strategic vision has set Europe on an apparently irreversible course to a very dangerous place. The future risks for Europe include: ongoing tensions and instability in Ukraine’s east; a costly and destabilising arms race with Russia; the potential for political, economic and social upheaval accompanying state failure in Ukraine and/or Russia; unfavourable geopolitical realignments; and undeliverable security assurances.
Competing territorial claims: an endless stand-off between Ukraine and Russia
Whether Russia is left in control of the currently occupied territories, or whether Russian troops pull back behind the agreed 1991 borders, the antagonists will inevitably suspect the other of revanchist ambitions. The occupied oblasts and Crimea are regarded as constitutionally defined sovereign territory by both sides and neither seems likely to relinquish their claim. Beyond that, Russia’s retreat from Crimea seems impossible and it will remain a permanent source of friction. A solution to the competing territorial claims is simply not apparent. The result will be a tense situation that will only be exacerbated by an arms race.
Bolstering Ukraine’s military capability: an inevitable arms race
Much of the European planned investment into Ukraine is destined for its already burgeoning armaments industry. The war has driven a Ukrainian revitalisation and revolution in armaments production, which emphasises lower cost, mass produced weapons and systems, and the testing of new capabilities in the field under combat conditions. Continued expansion of Ukraine’s defence production, especially with large-scale investment and subsidies from Europe, or technical support from the US, would be seen by Russia as a continuation of western encroachment on its western border. The building and maintaining of substantial and well-equipped standing forces in Ukraine would invoke a reciprocal response from Russia. Not only would this fail to decrease tension between Ukraine and Russia, but it would be likely to drive European nations to increase spending to bolster their own militaries.
Competing funding priorities: Ukrainian reconstruction versus armed neutrality
The rebuilding of Ukraine’s infrastructure and services will be expensive, complex, and drawn out. Without loans and subsidies from the Europeans, and considerable external private resources, capital, and labour, the Ukrainian economy will remain depressed. The urgent social demand for better living conditions, employment, and housing will be sharpened as internally relocated and externally displaced citizens return, as well as by veterans seeking reintegration. Prioritising the militarisation and fortification of Ukraine over social and productive economic investment could be contentious and politically charged. Where the sustained investment would come from for simultaneous reconstruction and militarisation remains uncertain. What is clear is that inadequate investment in reconstruction could have a weakening effect on Ukrainian governance and political stability.
One or more failed states?
Both Ukraine and Russia potentially could feel political and social convulsions when the fighting stops. A settlement that saw Ukraine cede even de facto control of Eastern Ukraine and Crimea, a high likelihood, would have serious ramifications. Returning veterans could feel betrayed by Ukrainian politicians and foreign supporters, and prove susceptible to demagogues and extremist politics. Political ambitions and differences suppressed during the conflict will reemerge, and disgruntled veterans could add to a volatile situation where renewed competition for power was intense. Add to this the potential for corruption at all levels as reconstruction funding floods the country, and the conditions for a failed state could be present.
In Russia, unless the regime can convincingly portray the outcome as a victory, a change in leadership might even follow the enormous human and economic losses incurred. In any event, politics in Russia will be unpredictable in the wake of a ceasefire or settlement: the regime might become still more authoritarian, or an even more nationalist one might replace it, or, less probable, democratic forces might overthrow the system.
Europe could be facing militarised, but dysfunctional, states on both sides of the border. Or, more significantly in geopolitical terms, the outcome for Russia could open up the opportunity for stronger relations between China and Russia.
Geopolitics: the prospect of closer alignment of Russia and China
China has important strategic interests in Russia. A Russian government unfriendly to China could not be tolerated, as it would lose the favourable strategic depth the vast hinterland of Russia provides. Moreover, in Eastern Russia China could not allow adversaries to enclose the Sea of Japan and Sea of Okhotsk, as this would be a devastating shift in strategic circumstances for China and its ally North Korea, and would threaten access to new Arctic sea routes. The compatible Eurasian geographies of Russia and China are often overlooked. China’s access to Russia’s hydrocarbons and other minerals is of vital interest, as is the potential for cooperation in exploiting the vast resources global warming is making accessible in the Arctic. For China, a Russia that sees its interests convergent with China’s is a key strategic goal.
The upshot is that China’s involvement in the rebuilding of Russia’s economy and military capabilities through investment and the sharing of technology must be expected. America’s declining interest in Europe as it pivots to homeland defence, and to western hemisphere matters, means the China-Russia relationship could prove to be the critical long-term strategic risk to Ukraine and Europe. With Chinese assistance Russia might recover from the war faster than Ukraine and its partnership with China strengthen.
The challenge of providing security assurances
Although the Ukrainians would like iron-clad security guarantees from the Europeans and Americans that they would provide sufficient military assistance, including combat forces, if a resurgent Russia resumed its aggression, it won’t happen. Ideally, Ukraine wants these guarantees to be provided via Ukraine’s membership in NATO, but this is a remote prospect. Outside of NATO, the large European powers are very unlikely in the current circumstances to enter into treaty level agreements with Ukraine or to pass legislation obliging future governments. Politics within EU countries is a further factor: the European leaders who are most vociferously committing rhetorically to Ukraine’s future have tenuous grasps on power in their own states, and are beset by insurgent parties not necessarily as pro-Ukraine. Europe’s ability to live up to its promises is constrained, and not least because enthusiasm for diverting taxpayers’ funds east will diminish as economic clouds descend on Europe.
Conclusion: Europe faces significant inter-related threats
Perpetual tensions, an arms race, failed states, geopolitical realignments, and undeliverable security assurances: European leaders face significant inter-related threats flowing from the potential settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. Solutions aren’t immediately apparent, or likely to be easy, and for the moment at least, Europe seems locked into a trajectory shaped by previous strategic policy choices that appear increasingly unsuited to the present circumstances.
To ameliorate the worst consequences of the identified potential risks, the Europeans need to move quickly to engage Russia in talks without preconditions. Over and above the consequences for Ukraine which must be given due weight, it is essential that the Europeans look beyond the actual end of the fighting to their preferred state-of-affairs for engaging in a relationship with Russia.
As Russia is not going anywhere, and will not be defeated, weakened, or isolated in the way assumed by the Europeans in the Biden era, an accommodation has to be reached. It is vital for the Europeans to develop a pragmatic and achievable joint vision of how to work peacefully with Russia, and then pursue it energetically.
Copyright Mike Scrafton. This article may be reproduced under a Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 licence for non-commercial purposes, and providing that work is not altered, only redistributed, and the original author is credited. Please see the Cross-post and re-use policy for more information.