In a democracy there should be a strong restraint on the public involvement of the military in national or high policy. The public intervention in strategic policy by UK chief of the defence staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Richard Knighton, and his German equivalent, General Carsten Breuer, is part of a disturbing trend.
Their years of training, study, and experience with military matters and the organisation for and application of military force endow Knighton and Breuer with significant credibility in these fields. However, they naturally tend to view the world through a particular prism, and to see as priorities those things that strengthen the organisations for which they are responsible, and which further the objectives for which these organisations exist. That doesn’t mean they are not genuine in their concerns, and the softness of public support for increased defence spending in Europe undoubtedly troubles and motivates them.
To make the case, not just for massive increases in military investment, but for the mobilisation of society across Europe, they write that “the complexity of threats demands a whole-of-society approach and an honest, continent-wide conversation with the public that defence cannot be the preserve of uniformed personnel alone”. This, in their minds, necessitates establishment of “resilient infrastructure, research and development in hi-tech from the private sector, and national institutions prepared to function under increasing threats”.
This is a theme prominent among the security-bureaucrats, the strategic commentariat, and senior military officers – who often combine the need for deterrence and resilience. Knighton and Breuer argue that “Strength deters aggression. Weakness invites it”. Not just the military strength but “Our industries must be capable of sustained output – manufacturing the ammunition, systems and platforms our forces require at the pace modern conflict demands”. In an actual conflict this amounts to an irrefutable truism as fighting is a costly, destructive, and wasteful business that can only be maintained at the scale and intensity required for success with adequate resupply, replacement, and repair.
But at the strategic level a rearming nation looks more like a threat to its neighbours, inflaming the security dilemma. That is, a state seeing its neighbour building its military capability can never be sure of its intentions, and is therefore impelled to build its own capability – in response to which its neighbour will further increase military investment. Preparing for war creates adversaries and increases the likelihood of its occurring.
The authors’ main thrust is that “Rearmament is not warmongering; it is the responsible action of nations determined to protect their people and preserve peace”. A prime issue here is proportionality. It is clear that Russia is seen as the threat, and this so evident to the military chiefs that explaining its nature is not required. So, Russia has been fighting for four years to overcome a nation which (in current US dollars) had a GDP per capita in 2021 of $4,776, compared to the figure for Russia of $12,521. The European Union’s GDP per capita in that year was $39,207. The innate capacity of Europe to recover and respond to a Russian conventional attack is great: as even the military chiefs assert, “When Europe acts together, we are a formidable force”.
Of course, economic power is a poor proxy for military power in the short term, but in the longer term it is decisive, and even in Ukraine – without committing forces – Europe has enabled David to resist Goliath. Invading Europe would be a strategic misjudgement of galactic proportions by Russia. One the Kremlin is unlikely to make. But the real problem of the proposals of Knighton and Breuer is a matter of duration. If alarmed by Russia, for how long and at what cost must Europeans pursue and sustain a “Whole-of-society defence”?
The Defence chiefs believe that “There is a moral dimension to this endeavour”, and they’re correct: but it’s not in they way they understand. While they argue “People must understand the difficult choices governments have to take in order to strengthen deterrence” they fail to spell out the consequences for individuals, democratic institutions and norms, or for society in general, of moving to a whole-of-society defence. In an actual war, when the threat is immediate, and potentially existential, the overriding or suspension of civil and political rights, and bureaucratic determination of industrial and other priorities is justifiable. But to take the step as a precaution is fraught for democracy.
The military force is maintained as a risk management exercise. Judicious calls are required by democratic governments in assessing the likelihood of the threat materialising against the possible harms and the potential for recovery. Polling shows that although European citizens are conscious that strategic conditions have deteriorated to the point that military conflict is possible, they are not so alarmed they would be prepared to accept a reduction in living standards through less services, or major restrictions on their liberty, in order to rearm.
To bend and orient the economy to a mobilised state has not been fully explored. For example, the cost to the budget of dedicated munitions factories producing shells, drones, or missiles poses a significant challenge. Either government incurs the costs of production and subsequent storage and stockpiling directly, or these enterprises would need to find an export market in an arena already crowded with other producers. The costs in terms of productivity in protected industries and enterprises deemed critical by security-bureaucrats could be high, as would the hardening and protection of energy-related facilities, and strategic infrastructure like ports and airfields. Either increased taxes or reduced services, a reduced standard of living in any event, would result.
It is simply the view from the barracks when Knighton and Breuer assert that “defence cannot be the preserve of uniformed personnel alone. It is a task for each and every one of us”. These are decisions into which military expertise is an important input. But just one consideration among many. Governments are elected in democracies to weigh all the factors and to act in the interests of the general good.
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