Conventional deterrence – Here and there

The deceit of deterrence: a bankrupt strategic justification for defence expenditure

23 December 2020 Mike Scrafton Australian focus, Strategy, defence and security

One of Australia’s three key strategic objectives is to “deter actions against our interests”, although what this means in practice is largely unexamined. Yet the concept of deterrence is frequently used to justify acquiring expensive, high-tech weapons platforms and systems. But what does the government envisage the submarines, new naval vessels, F-35s, and variety of long-range missiles will deter? In Australia’s strategic circumstances, what part can deterrence play in its strategic policy?

Perspectives on Nuclear Deterrence (Chatham House)

30 April 2020 Online editor Analysis and comment, Strategy, defence and security

This collection of essays explores, from the perspectives of eight experts, four areas of deterrence theory and policymaking: the underlying assumptions that shape deterrence practice; the enduring value of extended deterrence; the impact of emerging technologies; and the ‘blurring’ of the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons.

Australia-China relations and the logic of conventional deterrence

19 January 2020 Mike Scrafton Australian focus, By Mike Scrafton, Strategy, defence and security

To think Australia’s military strength is ever going to be sufficient to deter China from attacking is a fantasy. Rather, the need is for Australia to avoid situations in which it is likely to be confronted by overwhelming military force – a project that requires hard and continuous diplomatic work in building up shared understandings, channels of communications and robust relationships.